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It has now been nearly half a year since the European Central Bank declared its 
intention to buy some €1.1 trillion ($1.3 trillion) worth of eurozone bonds. When it first 
announced the so-called ‘extended asset-purchase programme’ in January, the ECB 
emphasised that it was only expanding an existing programme, under which it had 
been buying modest quantities of private-sector bonds, to government paper. But this 
pretence of continuity was just that: a pretence. 
In reality, by purchasing large volumes of government bonds, the ECB was crossing 
the Rubicon; after all, it is explicitly prohibited from financing governments. The ECB’s 
defence was that that the programme was the only way to move inflation closer to its 
target of close to 2%. Moreover, it pointed out, it was merely following the example of 
other major central banks, including the Bank of England, the Bank of Japan, and 
especially the US Federal Reserve, whose programme of quantitative easing (QE) 
entailed the purchase of more than $2 trillion worth of long-term securities from 2008 
to 2012. 
Legal uncertainty aside, whether the ECB’s decision to pursue QE can be justified 
ultimately depends on its impact. But after six months, that impact remains difficult to 
assess. 
One reason for this is that long-term interest rates are affected not only by the actual 
bond purchases, but also by financial markets’ expectations about future monetary 
policy. Indeed, just one day after the ECB made its announcement, interest rates fell 
by a fraction of a percentage point throughout the eurozone, although the programme 
was to be implemented weeks later. 
When the purchases began, rates did continue to fall for a few weeks, so much so that 
many were concerned that there would not be enough German bonds to meet the 
ECB’s country-debt quota (determined according to euro-area member states’ GDP 
and population). But rates have since risen again and have now returned, in real terms, 
to pre-QE levels. In this sense, the ECB’s bond-buying programme has been a failure. 
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Figure 1 below shows that with the onset of the ECB’s bond-buying programme, 
German long-term yields (the blue line) have become rather volatile.  Starting towards 
the end of 2014, when QE became ever more probable in the euro area, German yields 
declined rapidly and the decline continued over the first few weeks of actual purchase. 
But more recently, these rates have returned to their previous level. Moreover, the 
figure also shows that German rates are now back to the same level relative to US rates 
they had before QE started in the euro area. 
 
 
Source: Own calculations based on ECB data. 
Other indicators, however, paint a different picture. Notably, price growth turned 
positive last month, suggesting that the threat of deflation has been eliminated. This 
has prompted a modest uptick in expected inflation – the ECB’s favourite measure of 
price stability – not for the immediate future, but in five years, and then for five years. 
In concrete terms, the ECB is measuring its policy’s success today according to the 
inflation rate expected from 2020 to 2025. This figure, calculated from the prices of 
different types of indexed, and non-indexed, five- and ten-year bonds, is based on the 
somewhat heroic assumption that all of the markets for these bonds work efficiently. 
This presents a fundamental contradiction. QE is supposed to work via ‘portfolio 
balance effects’, which implies that markets are not fully efficient: purchases of longer-
term bonds affect financial conditions by changing the types and quantity of financial 
assets that the public holds. How can one use market prices as an indicator of inflation 
far into the future and simultaneously justify QE by claiming that most investors stick 
to certain asset classes and thus do not follow market signals efficiently? 
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Figure 1. A temporary transatlantic divergence?
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Another problem with using the five-year, five-year-forward rate of expected inflation 
to gauge QE’s effectiveness is that the rate is correlated with oil prices. Indeed, when 
oil prices fell last year, so did inflation expectations (however imperfectly measured). 
And the ECB’s QE announcement coincided with the beginning of the oil-price 
recovery, which could be expected to increase inflation expectations somewhat. 
With such coincidences and contradictions arising in nearly every aspect of the QE 
debate, it seems that evaluating the policy’s effectiveness is more of an art than a 
science. Unfortunately, this leaves plenty of room for distortion and bias. 
Most glaring is QE supporters’ tendency to ascribe any decline in interest rates before 
the policy was announced to market participants’ expectations that QE would be 
coming. Yet they do not apply the same reasoning to the decline in inflation 
expectations that occurred during the same period. They have followed the same logic 
since the purchases began, ignoring recent increases in interest rates, while lauding the 
small rise in inflation expectations as proof of QE’s effectiveness. 
In reality, of course, QE – whether the expectation or the execution of it – would affect 
both interest rates and the inflation expectations that are derived from them. So, when 
ECB President Mario Draghi stressed some weeks ago that nominal interest rates were 
lower than last August, he should have also acknowledged that, given low inflation 
expectations, real interest rates have moved little. 
This remains true today. As Figure 2 below shows, inflation expectations have moved 
in tandem on both sides of the Atlantic, and in the euro area they are now back to the 
level they were last summer. There was a dip in-between (which had motivated the 
ECB to undertake its QE), but it remains difficult to detect a lasting impact of QE. 
 
Source: Own calculations based on ECB data. 
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Figure 2. Break-even inflation on both sides of the Atlantic
DE US
4 | DANIEL GROS 
 
But such pragmatic thinking has been sorely missing from discussions about QE. 
Instead, each side has caricatured the other: supporters emphasise that QE has not led 
to runaway inflation anywhere, while opponents point out that nowhere has QE alone 
reignited robust growth. 
In fact, there has been neither inflation nor growth: central banks can seemingly pour 
hundreds of billions of dollars, euros or yen into the market with little discernible 
effect. So QE basically consists of an exchange of two low-yielding assets – long-term 
bonds against central-bank deposits. In broad and efficient markets, that exchange 
does not amount to much. 
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